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Methodological individualism often is seen as an import from the outside; something 
which threatens to colonize the discipline of sociology and to make it into something 
that it was not intended to be or at least to introduce some alien elements into the 
discipline. Often some form of “economic imperialism” is seen as the main culprit, 
but although Gary Becker (1976) and his “unflinching” economic approach to human 
behavior may appear simplistic and a bit offensive to many of us, it is important to be 
aware of that methodological individualism was not an invention of economists.  To 
the contrary, it is an important part of our own intellectual heritage. This is perhaps 
most clearly demonstrated in the work of Max Weber and in his insistence that one 
should never accept aggregate associations as explanatory until they have been broken 
down into intelligible patterns of individual action (see Udéhn 2001).  
Methodological individualism does not have any single accepted meaning. Simply 
uttering the words “methodological individualism” hence does not convey much in 
terms of meaning. Therefore, let us start with clarifying what we mean with the term. 
We start with briefly alluding to some positions to which it often but incorrectly is 
associated and then we provide what we believe to be an appropriate definition of the 
term. 
First of all, and as already Schumpeter emphasized a long time ago, to be a 
methodological individualist implies no commitment whatsoever to any other form of 
individualism, political or otherwise. It is a methodological position, pure and simple; 
a view of what acceptable explanations in the social sciences should be all about. 
Empirically Schumpeter’s point was perhaps most clearly demonstrated by the so-
called analytical Marxism that flourished in the 1980s (e.g., Roemer 1986). Some of 
the analytical Marxists sought to reconstruct Marxist theory on the basis of the 
principle of methodological individualism. 
Furthermore, methodological individualism implies no commitment to any specific 
type of intentional state that is assumed to motivate individuals to act as they do. In its 
barest form, as represented by Homans’ form of behavioristic methodological 
individualism (e.g., Homans 1987), it may not make any reference to mental or 
intentional states whatsoever. Most methodological individualists are not behaviorists, 
however; they focus on actions, i.e., behavior guided by intentions.  
Since methodological individualism so often is associated with “economic 
imperialism” and rational-choice theory, it is important to emphasize, once again, that 
the doctrine implies no commitment to any specific type of intentional state, and it 
does not deny the obvious fact that intentional states have important social 
dimensions. Hence methodological individualism is not rational-choice theory in 
disguise, and it does not imply a view of the social world as being composed of 
atomistic individuals. (For a discussion of the difference between atomism and 
individualism, see Pettit 1993.) 
Our preferred definition of the term is a slightly elaborated version of a definition 
once proposed by Jon Elster (1983): 
Methodological individualism is a doctrine according to which all social 
phenomena, their structure and change, are in principle explicable in terms of 
individuals, their properties, actions, and relations to one another. 
Methodological individualism is not only a positive statement about what in principle 
can be done, however; it also is a normative methodological statement about what 
ought to be done whenever possible, and we will return to this point later. 
Whether this type of doctrine should be labeled methodological individualism, 
sociological individualism, or structural individualism is of lesser importance to us. 
What is important is what it represents; and it represents a quest for causal depth in 
explanations. This causal depth is arrived at by making explicit the micro foundations, 
or the social cogs and wheels through which the macro outcomes to be explained are 
brought about. In this view, actions1 are important because nearly everything that 
interests us as sociologists are the intended or unintended outcomes of individuals’ 																																																								
1 From now on, unless otherwise noted, when referring to action we refer to intentionally motivated as 
well as unintentional behavior, i.e., as action and/or behavior as these terms were defined above. 
actions, and relations are important because relations to others are central when it 
comes to explaining the content of individuals’ intentional states as well as their 
action opportunities, and both of these are important for explaining why individuals 
do what they do. In addition, relations are central for explaining why, acting as they 
do, individuals bring about the social outcomes they do. 
That relations are important for explaining outcomes does not mean that they are 
independent of individuals and their actions, however. As emphasized above, in 
principle, all relational structures can be understood in terms of intended or 
unintended outcomes of individuals’ actions and intentional attitudes. This form of 
methodological individualism is perfectly compatible with an explanatory strategy 
that takes certain “structures” as exogenously given.  
We are not arguing for hypothetical “rock-bottom explanations” (Watkins 1957) that 
start from an idealized state of nature in which no social relations are assumed to exist 
or to matter.  Such thought experiments can be challenging and entertaining and they 
can be of use in normatively-oriented theory, but we do not see them as serious 
contenders for explanations of what is observed here and now. Many essential 
components of sociological explanations -- such as norms and networks – often are 
the results of long and intricate social processes. If we were to aim for “rock bottom” 
explanations, these sorts of components must either be ignored, which to us seem 
unacceptable; or they must be endogenized, which given the current state of social 
theory, in many cases is impossible.  For this reason, the realism and the precision of 
the proposed explanation is greatly improved if we take certain macro-level properties 
as given and incorporate them into the explanation.  
It is important to recognize that in contrast to some traditional forms of individualism, 
the sociological individualism we are advocating does not attempt to eliminate macro 
social phenomena from ontology or to reduce them to individual properties. In our 
view macro social phenomena are of central explanatory concern in sociology. The 
crucial issue is how to explain them. In order to get a better grasp of this, we need a 
clear idea of what kinds of things they are. 
 
Macro-social properties 
What are macro properties in the case of sociology? In our view, macro properties 
are properties of a collectivity or a set of micro level entities that are not definable 
for a single micro-level entity. In other words, macro properties are attributes of 
things like societies, communities, organizations and groups that are not 
meaningfully attributed to individuals. Quite often sociologists talk about macro 
properties in terms of structures, for example, when they talk about age structure or 
occupational structure. However, macro properties do not constitute a unified kind. 
For this reason, it is meaningful to characterize them with a sample of examples 
rather than a general definition (Hedström 2005).  
1) When sociologists are studying changes in racial prejudices over time, 
comparing communities with respect to their level of conformism, or trying 
to characterize organizational cultures, they are basically interested in typical 
behaviors, beliefs and attitudes of the members of these communities.  
2) When sociologists are studying ethnical segregation of cities, comparing 
societies in terms of inequality, or describing the social stratification of a 
society, they are addressing distributions of individuals and their various 
attributes.  
3) When sociologists are studying the spread of information within an 
organization, comparing groups with respect to their level of network 
clustering, or characterizing brokering opportunities of an individual 
occupying a structural whole, they are focusing on topologies of networks.  
This list of examples is not exhaustive, but it shows that macro social properties are 
a central descriptive and explanatory concern for sociology. In all these cases, the 
object of explanation is a social phenomenon that is an attribute of a collectivity of 
actors. Influential sociological analyses that exemplify this focus on social 
phenomena include Durkheim’s (1897) analysis of suicide rates, Weber’s (1904) 
analysis of why modern capitalism emerged in the Western world, and Coleman, 
Katz, and Menzel’s (1957) analysis of the diffusion of a new drug. In all of these 
analyses the entities to be explained were social or macro-level phenomena 
characterizing the properties of a collectivity or a group of individuals and these 
properties are not definable for a single individual. 
One way to characterize the relation between micro and macro is to employ the 
philosophical concept of supervenience (Horgan 1993, Kim 1993; Hedström & 
Bearman 2009). Briefly, a macro property, M, is said to supervene on a set of micro 
level properties, P, if identity in P necessarily implies identity in M (see Figure 1). If 
macro is supervenient upon the micro it means that, if two collectivities or societies 
are identical to one another in terms of their micro-level properties, then their macro 
level properties also will be identical. It also implies that two collectivities that differ 
in their macro level properties will necessarily differ in their micro level properties as 
well. As the slogan goes, there is no difference in macro properties without a 
difference in micro properties. However, the relation of supervenience does not imply 
that two collectivities with identical macro level properties will necessarily have 
identical micro level properties because identical macro-level properties can be 
”realized” in different ways.  Let us take two simple examples to illustrate the point of 
multiple realizability. First, the divorce rate of a society (a macro-level property) can 
be exactly the same at two points in time although it is not the same individuals who 
are married and divorced at the two points in time. Second, a social network 
describing the links that exist between a group of individuals can have identical 
macro-level properties (density, centrality, degree distribution, etc) at different points 
in time although the micro-level details of the network, who is linked to whom, may 
have changed considerably. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Micro-macro relations as supervenience relations. 
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 It is important to recognize that the relationship between a macro property and its 
micro level realization should not be viewed as a causal relation. Rather, the relation 
is that of constitution: the set of micro level facts constitute the macro level fact. The 
difference between constitution and causation is ontological: whereas cause and effect 
are distinct parts of a temporal process, there is no temporal difference between the 
set of macro properties and the set of micro properties that constitute it. Similarly, 
whereas cause and effect can be thought of as ”distinct existences” as David Hume 
required, this idea does not make sense in the case of constitution. To have certain 
micro properties is to have certain macro properties. For example, the social 
cohesiveness of a group is not caused by group members having certain attitudes and 
relations toward each other (at that same time). Rather, the cohesiveness consists of 
them having those attitudes and relations. 
The notion of supervenience has been used much in philosophy of mind to 
characterize the relation between the mental and the physical (Horgan 1993, Kim 
1993). Although some authors (for example, Sawyer 2005) have found this analogy 
inspiring, we would take a more cautious attitude towards importing arguments from 
philosophy of mind. There the central challenge is to see how the rich conceptual 
apparatus employing mental concepts can be accommodated with the idea of a 
physical reality that is devoid of any intrinsic intentionality. This is quite different 
from the situation in the social sciences. There is no comprehensive conceptual 
apparatus to explain and describe social phenomena in terms of supra-individual 
properties. What we have is a mixed lot of different kinds of macro properties and 
some relatively local patterns of empirical regularities between them. Second, ‘the 
individual level’ cannot be constructed analogous to the physical. The supervenience 
base includes things that are not attributes of individuals, for example technological 
artefacts. It is also highly controversial which properties are properly ‘individual’. For 
example, many of the relational properties that are considered by structural 
individualists to be micro properties, are regarded by anti-individualists as non-
individual properties.  
From our point of view, the layered picture of the social world inspired by philosophy 
of mind has very little to give for the social sciences. Even if it were possible to 
characterize the unique contrasts between individual and social levels, this would 
have very little methodological relevance. In contrast, the micro-macro distinction is 
important in all sciences. We suggest that the notion of supervenience is used only in 
the modest role of characterizing particular micro and macro relations. The difference 
between the two is a difference of scale that is analogical to part-whole relationship. 
Whereas the contrast between ‘individual’ and ‘social’ levels is categorical, micro-
macro relations constitute a continuum of contrasting scales. Whether an attribute is a 
macro or micro property depends on what it is contrasted with. A friendship 
relationship is a macro property from the psychological point of view, but a micro 
property when considered from the point of view of the social networks within a 
community.  
At the core of our version of sociological individualism is the idea of mechanistic 
explanation. In this view, an explanation of an observed association between macro-
level properties requires explication of mechanisms that produce the regularity. The 
logic of mechanistic explanation leads us to look at the micro foundations of the 
macro pattern. We should first look at what kinds of micro level processes, properties, 
and relations constitute the relevant macro properties. Whatever properties the social 
whole (group, organization, community) has, we should always ask, what makes the 
whole have those properties? In contrast to the emergentist views (e.g. Sawyer 2005), 
that tend to regard macro properties as unexplainable novelties, our mechanistic view 
regards it as a tractable research problem. And whatever macro level causal properties 
the whole has, they are causal properties of the micro level constellations.  
The next step in the search for a mechanistic explanation of an observed association 
between macro-level properties is to understand the causal relations between the 
micro constellations that realize the macro properties of interest. The idea is to 
examine how the changes in the large scale (the macro) are brought about by local 
level interactions (the micro). Only by looking under the hood of the car, we can 
understand what makes it move move. Similarly only by looking at the level of 
interacting agents, can we understand what drives the macro level changes (or 
stability) being observed. Notice that in these accounts the beliefs the individuals have 
about macro properties might have a crucial role. For example, an individual’s 
decision of whether or not to join a social movement can be influenced by the 
individual’s beliefs about the proportion of other individuals in the relevant reference 
group who already have joined the movement (e.g., Granovetter 1978). It is not part 
of our individualism to reduce the contents of mental representations of individuals to 
some privileged ‘individualist’ language.  
This logic of mechanistic explanation can be illustrated considering Weber’s (partial) 
explanation of the emergence of modern capitalism in Western Europe. Weber starts 
with an idea that was a commonplace in late 19th century Europe: there is a close 
connection between Protestantism, entrepreneurism, and the rise of capitalism. In 
order to give flesh to this vague explanatory suggestion he asked what kind of 
changes the emergence of Protestantism brought about in the beliefs, desires and 
communal practices of individual agents. This is basically an answer to our 
constitutive question: it tells us what constitutes ‘the protestant ethic’. Then Weber 
moves to the causal question: how these changed life practices of individuals brought 
about changes in economic activities and institutions that then facilitated the 
formation of modern capitalism. As the endless debates about “the Weber thesis” 
illustrate, many details of this causal story are missing and it is still open issue how 
important these factors actually were. Whatever is the final verdict on these issues, 
from our point of view it is notable that Weber’s work illustrates the mechanistic 
explanatory strategy we are advocating.  
As noted above, the idea of mechanistic explanation does not imply that we have to 
always regress to some specific and privileged ‘individual level’ in our explanations. 
Rather, it demands that we make sense of the macro pattern in terms of some well-
understood micro mechanisms. The properties and processes included in these micro 
mechanisms can then themselves be turned into objects of mechanistic explanations. 
Just like in other sciences, mechanistic explanation in social sciences is based on 
chains of mechanistic levels, not some privileged level of explanation.  
From an explanatory point of view, explicating the links between micro and macro 
and how they evolve over time, are fundamental because macro level regularities say 
so little about why we observe what we observe. The knowledge of underlying causal 
mechanisms improves our understanding of a social phenomenon in a number of a 
different ways (Ylikoski 2010). First, it helps us to understand why the macro level 
regularity holds (or why there are no macro level regularities) and what are its 
background conditions. Second, it connects the causal claim with other pieces causal 
knowledge and thus integrates our knowledge of the phenomenon. Third, it helps us 
to understand under which conditions the macro level generalization breaks apart. 
 
Computer simulation and sociological explanations 
Until very recently we did not have the analytical tools needed for analyzing the 
dynamics of complex systems that large groups of interacting individuals represent. 
But powerful computers and simulation software has changed the picture. So-called 
agent-based computer simulation has a promise of transforming important parts of 
sociological theory because they allow for rigorous theoretical analyses of large 
complex systems (see Macy and Willer 2002; Epstein 2006). The basic idea behind 
such analyses is to identify the core mechanisms believed to be at work, assemble 
them into a simulation model, and run the simulation to establish the macro-level 
outcomes expected given the micro-level assumptions of the model. 
The most famous example of agent-based simulation in the social sciences is Thomas 
Schelling’s (1971) segregation model. As it has been used as an example so many 
times before, we will illustrate the principles involved in these types of analyses with 
a study of self-enforcing norms by Damon Centola, Robb Willer and Michael Macy 
(2005, see also Willer, Kuwabara and Macy 2009). They use agent-based modeling to 
examine the population level implications of false enforcement as a signal of 
sincerity. In the model, a very small fraction of true believers can spark a cascade of 
conformity and false enforcement that quickly engulfs a vulnerable population. This 
does not happen because people are converted to new beliefs, but because they feel a 
need to affirm the sincerity of their false conformity. Let us start by taking a look at 
the ideas of self-enforcing norms and illusions of sincerity, and then see how agent-
based simulation can be used to understand these phenomena. 
It is easy to see why people would pressure others to behave the way they want them 
to behave. However, the tricky question is why would people publicly enforce a norm 
that they secretly wish would go away? Centola et al. suggest that in these cases the 
people who really want to enforce the norm, can trigger enforcement cascades which 
result in others enforcing norms that they do not privately support. For true believers, 
it is not sufficient that others do the right thing; they must do it for the right reason. 
This creates a problem for those who are not committed to the norm but want to avoid 
sanctions from the true believers: they must somehow prove their sincerity in order to 
avoid being exposed as posers. One way to demonstrate sincerity is to sanction those 
who voice opposition to the norm. The enforcement of the norm serves as a signal of 
a genuine conviction.  
The above reasoning shows that cascades of self-enforcing norms are possible, but it 
tells us very little about the circumstances under which they are likely to emerge. Can 
self-enforcing norms emerge in a reluctant population without top-down institutional 
repression or without special circumstances that jump-start the process? Can the 
process be entirely self-organizing? How many true believers are needed and how 
weak-willed must the disbelievers be for a cascade to start unfolding? Verbal 
theorizing cannot answer these questions and it is very difficult to study these kinds of 
processes purely empirically. Centola et. al. show how agent-based computer 
simulations can be used for getting leverage on dynamics that would otherwise be 
intractable. 
In the simulations, the population consists of agents who differ in their beliefs and 
convictions. A small group of true believers is assumed to have such strong 
convictions that they always comply with the norm. When dissatisfied with the level 
of compliance by others, they may enforce the norm. The remainder of the population 
consists of disbelievers who privately oppose the norm, but with less conviction 
compared to that of the true believers. The disbelievers may deviate from the norm or 
even pressure others to deviate as well. However, the disbelievers can also be 
pressured to support the norm and even to enforce it. At every iteration of the 
simulation, each agent observes how many of its neighbors comply with the norm and 
how many deviate. They also observe how many neighbors are enforcing the 
compliance and how many are enforcing deviations from the norm. Based on this 
information, the agents decide whether they comply or deviate and whether they 
enforce others to behave similarly in the next round. 
In their simulations Centola et. al. manipulated three kinds of conditions: 1) the 
access to information about the behavior of other agents; 2) the frequency distribution 
and clustering of true believers; and 3) the network topology. The results of these 
simulations were surprising: the cascades are much easier to achieve than expected. A 
small group of true believers can bring about a cascade in population where the 
neighborhoods are local, but not in unembedded (fully connected) populations. Also 
the clustering of the true believers turned out to be relevant: a very small cluster of 
believers can trigger the cascade, while a great number of randomly distributed 
believers cannot achieve this. Finally, when a small number of random ties reduced 
the overlap between local neighborhoods, the cascades were prevented. On the basis 
of these observations Centola et. al. concluded that unpopular norms thrive on local 
misrepresentations of the underlying population distribution, that is, the cascades are 
outcomes of a sampling problem. However, the most interesting result was that 
disbelievers are crucial for the emergence of cascades. Without them the cascades do 
not get started and if they start to convert to true believers, the following of the norm 
might paradoxically collapse. 
The paper by Centola et. al. is an excellent example both of the use of agent-based 
simulation in sociological inquiry and of the kind of sociological individualism we are 
advocating. It shows how a well-designed simulation can expand the reach of 
sociological theory and raise new and well-defined problems for empirical research. It 
also shows how looking at the mechanisms by which macro level facts are generated 
and realized enhances the causal depth of sociological explanations. The models by 
Centola et al. show how simple and predictable local interactions generate familiar 
but puzzling macro patterns, such as wide-spread enforcement of unpopular norms.  
It is important to understand that simulations like these are not intended to be 
representations of any particular empirical phenomena. Their purpose is theoretical 
and they can be regarded as dynamic thought experiments. Such thought experiments 
are not mere fairy tales when they are used as a part of a program of systematic 
theoretical research that explores a series of what if questions. Much of the 
development of mechanism-based knowledge in the science consists of developing 
how-possibly explanation schemes. These schemes are not intended to directly 
explain any particular empirical facts, but to provide general understanding of how 
things could work.  
Social processes are usually so complex that outcomes become virtually impossible to 
explain without the aid of some formal analytical tools. Without such tools it is 
difficult to recognize, and even more difficult to convince others, that the large-scale 
phenomena that one seeks to explain may be the result of a particular type of 
mechanism. Simulation allows us to see how the phenomenon to be explained could 
have been generated and how changes in action logics or relational structures are 
likely to change the macro outcome. Simulations increase our explanatory 
understanding (Ylikoski and Kuorikoski 2010), both by making it possible to track the 
dependencies and by making our theoretical inferences more reliable. Joshua Epstein 
(2006, p. 53) has formulated this insight about generative explanation as a slogan: ‘If 
you didn’t grow it, you didn’t explain it.’ 
The process of building a formal model forces the theorist to make explicit her 
reasoning and makes it possible to see what follows from given assumptions. 
Similarly, the model-building allows for the same type of piecemeal theoretical 
development that has been useful in other sciences. Sociologists should regard the 
method of isolation and abstraction (Mäki 1992) as an indispensable part of theory-
development: empirical reality is complex and it is futile to try to capture it in all its 
complexity. However, it should be kept in mind that simplicity and elegance are only 
instrumental values and should not override the aim of accurately describing the real 
causal mechanisms producing the observable phenomena. Rather than seeking 
excessively precise fictions, social scientists should aim for theoretical assumptions 
known to be at least roughly correct. As Tukey (1962: 15-16) once put it, ‘far better 
an approximate solution to the right question than …an exact answer to the wrong 
question’. 
Conclusions 
In this paper we have been advocating a form of sociological individualism that is 
substantially different from many traditional forms of methodological individualism, 
but still has a methodological bite. It emphasizes the importance of asking causal 
questions and thinking in terms of mechanisms. The mechanistic approach to 
explanation does not attempt to eliminate macro social factors from sociological 
explanations, nor does it attempt to reduce them. It rather bridges macro facts to 
micro facts by means of mechanistic explication of causal processes.  
 
The central message of this approach is the following: in order to understand macro 
and micro dynamics, we must study the collectivity as a whole, but we must not study 
it as a collective entity. Only by taking into account the individual entities, their 
properties, relations, and activities, can we understand the collective dynamics. 
Without tools like agent-based simulations it would be impossible to predict and 
explain the dynamics. Since tools like these are becoming increasingly more available 
and easy to use, the future of sociology as a rigorous scientific discipline looks to us 
brighter than it has ever done before. 
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